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NOTE
A THREAT TO OR PROTECTION OF
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS? THE
IMPACT OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD
AND ABUSE ACT ON BUSINESSES
JESSICA MILANOWSKI

"

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 ("CFAA") criminalizes
unauthorizedaccess to information stored on computers and allows for
those who are damaged by such unauthorized access to bring a civil
suit againstthe abuser. Currently, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have
split regarding the proper interpretationsof the terms "authorization
and "exceeds authorized access" on employer-provided computer use.
The Seventh Circuit adopted a broad reading of the statute in
International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, holding that when the
employee decided to quit his job in violation of his employment
contract, he violated his duty of loyalty and therefore no longer had
authorization to use his work laptop. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
developed a narrow reading of the statute in United States v. Nosal,
finding that the employee misused confidential information when he
took, downloaded, and copied a confidential source list of information
and datafrom the searchfirm's computer system. However, since the
employee did not access the information himself he could not be held
liable under the CFAA. This Comment first analyzes the background
and history of the CFAA and cases that have contributed to the circuitsplit. Next, this Comment addresses a hypothetical scenario of an
employee who searches through his employer's confidential files and
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trade secrets to build a competing business. Finally, it recommends the
Ninth Circuit interpretation be adopted either by Congress or the
United States Supreme Court.
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INTRODUCTION

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 ("CFAA") criminalizes
unauthorized access to confidential information stored on computers,' and
it is often applied to employer-employee trade secret disputes.2 However,

1.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2010) (prohibiting certain computer use "without
authorization" or that "exceeds authorized access" as defined in the statute).
2.
See Cynthia Augello, CircuitSplit: How Does the CFAA Apply to Employment
Cases?, JDSuPlA (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/circuit-splithow-does-the-cfaa-apply-t-93612/ (explaining that the CFAA provides a potential
avenue for employers to seek redress in conflicts with employees); Katherine
Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees'
Authorization Under the Computer Fraudand Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 820
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today, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits are split concerning the proper
interpretation for the terms "authorization" and "exceeds authorized
access" as it pertains to employee use of an employer-provided computer
within the context of the CFAA. 3 The Seventh Circuit adopted a broad
interpretation of the statute in InternationalAirport Centers, LLC v. Citrin.
The Court held that when the employee decided to quit in violation of his
employment contract, he violated his fiduciary duty of loyalty, and
therefore he no longer had authorization to use his work laptop.4
The Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have developed a
correspondingly narrow reading in determining whether the CFAA applies
only when an employee improperly accesses business information or also
when an employee uses that information in pursuit of his own business and
In United States v. Nosal, the Ninth
to the detriment of his employer.
Circuit upheld the employee's misuse of confidential information from the
search firm's computer system as lawful. 6 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in
WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, held that an employee
does, not violate the CFAA when he downloads information to a personal
computer, violates company policy, and subsequently uses that information
to develop a competing business.7
(2009) (noting that even though computers increase employee productivity, they also
make confidential information more easily accessible to employees).
3.
See Stuyvie Pine, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Circuit Split and
Efforts to Amend, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. BOLT (Mar. 31, 2014), http://btlj.org/?p=3260
(comparing the Ninth Circuit's "access-only" interpretation with the "use-and-access"
interpretation).
4.
See Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that the employee's breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency
relationship and, with it, his authority to access the employer-provided computer
because the only basis for his continued use of the computer had been that established
agency relationship); see also Anderson, infra note 9, at 431 (noting that an agency
relationship ends when an employee violates his duty of loyalty).
5.
See Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, Fourth Circuit Widens Split Over CFAA
and Employees Violating Computer Use Restrictions, KILPATRICK TOWNSEND LEGAL
ALERT (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.martindale.com/matter/asr-1585570.CFAA.pdf
(discussing the importance of employers implementing strict guidelines governing
which employees may access certain information).
6.
See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 2012) (refusing to
interpret the CFAA broadly to cover violations of corporate computer use restrictions
or violations of a duty of loyalty).
7.
See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th
Cir. 2012) (rejecting an interpretation of the CFAA that imposes liability on employees
who violate a use policy, choosing instead to limit such liability to "individuals who
access computers without authorization or who obtain or alter information beyond the
bounds of their authorized access"); id. (explaining the court's holding that the CFAA
cannot be used to impose liability on an employee who is given lawful access to
company information but later misuses that information).
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This Comment will conduct a thorough exploration of the history of the
CFAA, detailing the rationales of the opposing circuits, and addressing the
theory of agency law and its application to the CFAA and cases concerning
the statute. This Comment will then delve into a hypothetical scenario of
an employee who searches through his employer's confidential files and
trade secrets to build a competing business. It will subsequently apply each
circuit's different rationales and approaches to the issue, which will result
in different outcomes in what actions the employer can bring over her
stolen information. 9 The first result will be more employee-friendly, while
the second result will be more employer-friendly. Finally, this Comment
will recommend that the United States Supreme Court adopt the Ninth
Circuit's broader interpretation of the CFAA. In the alternative, Congress
could revamp the statute for clarification in the modern world or instead
create a whole new piece of legislation that specifically addresses this
technological issue, particularly in the employment context.
I. A THOROUGH EXPLORATION OF THE HISTORY OF THE CFAA AND THE
OPPOSING CIRCUIT RATIONALES

A. The Computer Fraudand Abuse Act

'

The CFAA criminalizes unauthorized access to information stored on
computers, and it allows for those damaged by such unauthorized access to
bring a civil suit against the abuser.10 The CFAA prohibits a person from
"intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization" or
"exceed[ing] authorized access," thereby obtaining "information" from a
computer that is "used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 1
The CFAA's definition of "exceeds authorized access" is "to access a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser [sic] is not entitled so to
obtain or alter,"l 2 which is distinguished from the term, "without
authorization." 3 The CFAA provides that whoever knowingly causes the
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result
8. See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the convalescence of
business, corporate, and agency law).
9.
See Alden Anderson, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Hacking Into the
Authorization Debate, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 447 (2013) (explaining that competing

interpretations of the CFAA can lead to vastly different results).
10. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2010).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 1030(e)(1), (6).
13. Id. § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4).
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of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization to a
protected computer violates the Act.1 4 If one is found to have "exceeded
authorized access" and violated the Act, the CFAA allows for the
enforcement of criminal sanctions when additional aggravating factors are
met,' 5 and it permits private parties who suffer "damage or loss by reason
of a violation" to bring a claim for damages.' 6
Congress originally enacted the CFAA to combat computer hacking,
which targeted third parties accessing private computer systems without
permission and/or authorization.' 7 However, employers have recently
attempted to use the CFAA's broad language to cover a range of issues
well beyond hacking, such as individuals stealing trade secrets from
employers or employees misusing employer information gathered from
employer-provided computers. Thus, the circuits have split concerning the
statute's reach and how it ought to be currently applied to employees as
third parties who exceed the scope of their authorized use of work
computers.' 8
B. The Theory ofAgency Law
Agency law has a substantial influence on the CFAA.' 9 The theory of
14. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i).
15. See id. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (making it a crime to attempt or to commit any of the
enumerated offenses); see also id. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (explaining that a violation or
attempted violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C) is a felony if one of these aggravating factors is
present: "(a) committed for commercial advantage or private financial gain, (2)
committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States or of any State, or (3) the value of the information obtained
exceeds, $5,000"); H. Marshall Jarrett et al., Prosecuting Computer Crimes,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMPUTER CRIMES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION

CRIMINAL
DIVISION,
20
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalccips/legacy/2015/01/14/cemanual.pdf (stating that if the aggravating factors apply, a
violation is punishable by a fine, up to five years' imprisonment, or both).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g); see also Dial, supra note 5 (providing background on
the various CFAA interpretations).
17.
See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
Congress enacted the CFAA primarily to address the growing problem of computer
hacking); Orzechowski, infra note 18. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERv., RL97-1025, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS

(2014) (showcasing Congress' intent when it created the CFAA).
18.
See Daren M. Orzechowski et al., A Widening Circuit Split in the
Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WHITE & CASE LLP (Sept. 13,
2012), http://www.whitecase.com/articles-09132012/#.VHp5P75UFVs (noting that the

Circuit Courts of Appeals have not provided clear guidance on the proper CFAA
interpretation).
19. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (defining "agency"); see also
Thomas E. Geu, A Selective Overview of Agency, Good Faith, and Delaware Entity
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the duty of loyalty, which is a subset of the fiduciary duty theory, requires
all corporate fiduciaries to exercise their authority in a good faith attempt to
advance corporate purposes. 2 0 Agency law can be used as an aid to give
meaning to statutes that either establish agency relationships or govern
behavior that falls within the law of agency. 2 1 This type of relationship is
especially apparent in the employer-employee setting where the duties of
good faith, loyalty, and due care are ever present.2 2
Some jurisdictions find that partnership duties exceed written
agreements. For example, in Meinhardv. Salmon, the Court of Appeals of
New York held that the partnership contract did not entirely encompass the
obligations between the parties, pushing partnership duties beyond the
scope of the agreed terms. 2 3 For example, a co-adventurer has the duty to
concede and reveal any chance to compete and any chance to enjoy the
opportunity for benefit that had come to him alone by virtue of his
24
agency.
The Court determined that in such a relationship, loyalty must be
undivided and unselfish, and that a breach of fiduciary duty can occur by
something less than fraud or intentional bad faith.25
C. Seventh CircuitAnalysis
Some circuit courts have adopted a broad reading of the CFAA.2 6
Initially, the First Circuit in EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica, held that an
employee "exceeded authorized access" by violating restrictions on both
use and access of employers' computers.2 7 The Seventh Circuit later joined
Law, 10 DEL. L. REv. 17, 18 (2008) (discussing the concept that agency law influences
and interacts with more specific laws where agency relationships inherently develop).
20.
See ALLEN, supra note 8 (explaining the academic theories behind agency
law).
21. See Geu, supra note 19 (noting that CFAA interpretation demands analysis of
traditional agency fiduciary duties).
22. See Field, supra note 2, at 823 (explaining that the employer-employee agency
relationship imposes "special duties on the part of both the employer and the employee
which are not present in the performance of other types of contracts.").
23. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (noting "a trustee is held
to stricter morals than that of a marketplace").
24. See id. (stating that those who engage in joint ventures owe to one another the
finest duty of loyalty).
25. See id. (holding that one partner may not appropriate a renewal of a lease for
himself, even when its term begins at the end of the partnership agreement).
26. See Augello, supra note 2 (detailing that the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits have adopted a broad statutory interpretation of the CFAA finding that an
employee acts "without authorization or in excess of his authority when the employee
acquires an interest adverse to his employer or breaches a duty of loyalty owed to the
employer.")
27. See EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica, 274 F.3d 577, 583-84 (1st Cir. 2001)
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in InternationalAirport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, stating that once the duty of
loyalty has been violated, accessing computer files that had previously been
authorized transforms into unauthorized access under the CFAA. 28 This
means that an employee can "exceed authorized access" by violating a
company's terms of service policy and by breaching the duty of loyalty
under agency law.29 In InternationalAirport Centers, LLC, the employee
quit his job and started a competing business, which was in violation of his
employment contract. 3 0 The employee deleted files from his work laptop
before he left, including information that he wanted to resign and develop a
competing business, because the company's employee policy allowed for
data deletion. 3 1 However, the Seventh Circuit held that, since he violated
his contract when he decided to quit, he breached his duty of loyalty and
lost his authorized access to the work laptop. 32
The Fifth,3 3 Eleventh,3 4 and Eighth35 Circuits have since joined the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation.36 In United States v. John, the Fifth
Circuit Court held that an employee exceeded her authorized access by
(explaining that while the employee's use of a company website was public, so he was
authorized, he exceeded his authorization by providing proprietary information about
the structure of the website to a competing entity).
28. See Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the employee's breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency
relationship with the employer).
29.
Orzechowski, supra note 18; see e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Aaron's Law:
Violating a Site's Terms of Service Should Not Land You in Jail, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
16, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/aarons-law-violatin
g-a-sites-terms-of-service-should-not-land-you-in-jail/267247/ (explaining that terms of
services have been interpreted as rules of contract. When one young man exceeded
those limits, the government charged that he had breached an implied contract and
therefore was a felon under the CFAA).
30. See Int'lAirport Ctrs., 440 F.3d at 421 (rejecting the employee's argument that
he did not violate the CFAA when he destroyed data because the employee policy
allowed data deletion, and ultimately finding it unlikely that the provision was intended
to authorize employees to destroy data that they knew the company had no duplicates
of and would have wanted to have).
31. See id. at 420-21 (listing actions adverse to the employer as reasons for CFAA
violation).
32. See id. at 421; see also Orzechowski, supra note 18 (concluding that courts
who follow the Citrin approach provide the broadest protection to employers).
33. See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
34. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
35. See United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2011).
36. See Elkhan Abramowitz & Barry Bohrer, Different Strokes: Interpreting
Computer Fraudand Abuse Act, 24 N.Y. L.J. 45 (2012) (suggesting that the CFAA
circuit split in employment cases brought against employees, alleged to have
misappropriated information from an employer's computer, is presently widely
publicized).
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using a customer's personal information to make fraudulent credit card
charges. 37 In United States v. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit held that an
employee's use of the Social Security Administration's database exceeded
authorized access when the employee used it to retrieve personal
information about potential romantic partners.3 8 In United States v.
Teague, the Eighth Circuit rejected the notion that an employee did not
exceed authorized access to obtain President Obama's student loan
records. 39 These cases further explain the broad reading rationale of the
CFAA.
D. Ninth Circuit Analysis
Conversely, some circuits have developed a narrow reading of the
CFAA. 40 The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Nosal held that an
individual "exceeds authorized access" by violating a restriction on access
but not by violating a restriction on use of a work computer and its
contents. 4 1 In this case, an individual employee convinced some of his
former colleagues to download confidential information from the search
firm they worked for and have them send the information to him.42 Even
though his colleagues had authorized access to the confidential
information, they violated company policy, which prohibited "(1) using
confidential information for nonbusiness purposes and (2) transferring the
information to third parties." 4 3 This means that an individual "exceeds
authorized access" by violating a restriction on access but not by violating

37. See John, 597 F.3d at 267 (concluding that "when the user knows or
reasonably should know that he or she is not authorized to access a computer and
information obtainable from that access in furtherance of or to perpetrate a crime," he
has exceeded authorized access, even though he may have been permitted
authorization).
38. See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263-64 (finding that an employee exceeds
authorized access when his interest in acquiring the confidential information is to the
detriment of his employer).
39. See Teague, 646 F.3d at 1127 (determining that to convict a person under the
CFAA, it must be proven that he or she intentionally exceeded authorized access).
40. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the
argument that the CFAA should be read to incorporate corporate policies addressing
information use); see also Orzechowski, supra note 18 (explaining that along with the
Ninth and the Fourth Circuits, district courts in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits have also adopted similarly narrow interpretations of the CFAA).
41. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (holding that the employees did not "exceed their
authorized access" by violating company policy against using the database for noncompany business).
42.

See id. at 856.

43.

Id. at 862.
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The Ninth

Circuit has decided to interpret the statute narrowly and only apply it to
those who access an unauthorized computer. However, the CFAA does not
apply to those who have the authorized access and later use that
information to the detriment of their employer.45 This sentiment holds
whether or not the action violates the employer's computer use policies.46
The Fourth Circuit has since sided with the Ninth Circuit.4 7 In WEC
CarolinaEnergy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, the Court held that an employee,
who downloaded information to a personal computer, violated company
policy, and used that information to develop a competing business, did not
violate the CFAA because he did not access the files without authorization
or illegally.4 8 This case further explains the broad reading rationale of the

CFAA.
E. Comparingand Contrastingthe Broad and Narrow Interpretationsof
the CFAA and How It Applies to Agency Law
There are vast differences between these two interpretations of the
49
CFAA.
Under a Seventh Circuit regime, any employee that accesses
information on a computer to use that information to the detriment of his
employer has violated a duty of loyalty under agency law, which terminates
the agency relationship and no longer gives that employee proper
44.

See id.

45. See id. 856-57 (reasoning that the government's interpretation would change
the CFAA from "an anti-hacking statute to an expansive misappropriation statute").
46. See id at 860-61 ("Basing criminal liability on violations of private computer
use polices can transform whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved. Employees who call family
members from their work phones will become criminals if they send an email instead.
Employees can sneak in the sports section of the New York Times to read at work, but
they'd better not visit ESPN.com. And Sudoku enthusiasts should stick to the printed
puzzles, because visiting www.dailysudoku.com from their work computers might give
them more than enough time to hone their Sudoku skills behind bars. The effect this
broad construction of the CFAA has on workplace conduct pales by comparison with
its effect on everyone else who uses a computer, smart-phone, iPad, Kindle, Nook, Xbox, Blu-Ray player, or any other Internet-enabled device.").
47. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 199 (4th
Cir. 2012).
48. See id. at 204 (ruling that an employee only exceeds authorized access by
hacking); see also Dial, supra note 5 (interpreting the Fourth Circuit's position to mean
that CFAA liability may be imposed when an employee goes "beyond the bounds" of
his authorized access").
49. See Orzechowski, supra note 18 (arguing that further CFAA interpretation is
an issue that should be closely monitored); Abramowitz, supra note 36 (comparing the
potentially detrimental effects of a Ninth Circuit CFAA interpretation with a Fourth
Circuit CFAA interpretation).
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authorization."o Any rights of authorization that the employee had were
governed by the agency relationship, so once the relationship has been
destroyed, authorized access is also destroyed."
In addition, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits focused on what the
employer's terms-of-use policy consisted of as well as the employee's
knowledge about the policy. 5 2 Based on the holdings in John and
Rodriguez, liability under the CFAA may attach if a court finds that an
employee accessed a protected computer in a way that was prohibited5 or
in excess of limitations set by a contract or a clearly communicated
employer policy. 54 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit limits application of the
term "exceeds authorized access" to situations relating to improper access
of a computer and any information stored thereon, but it does not include
the use of information that has been derived. 5 The Ninth Circuit explained
that, based on legislative intent and legislative history, the CFAA was not
meant to remedy misappropriated trade secrets where an employee is still
56
authorized to access confidential information.
Under such a reading, nor

50. Contra WEC CarolinaEnergy Solutions, LLC, 687 F.3d at 206 (rejecting the
idea that an employee who uses his computer access for a purpose that is not in sync
with the employer's interest could be held liable under the CFAA).
51. See Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding
that an employee's authorization ends when he or she violates the duty of loyalty owed
to the employer).
52. See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010) (condemning the
employee's violation of the employee policy); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d
1258, 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that accessing confidential information for
nonbusiness purposes exceeded the employee's authorized access).
53. See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260 (explaining that although Rodriguez, the
employee, never signed a written acknowledgement of the policy warning employees
that they faced criminal penalties if they violated policies on authorized use of
databases, the court ultimately concluded that even though there was no formal written
agreement in place, accessing information in violation of a corporate computer-use
policy equated to "exceeding authorized access" under the CFAA).
54. See John, 597 F.3d at 273 (holding that John, the employee, exceeded her
authorized access by violating her employer's clearly communicated and wellestablished policies that prohibited accessing customer data in furtherance of a
criminally fraudulent scheme).
55. See e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2012)
(explaining the two schools of CFAA interpretation: the narrower interpretation
believes "exceeds authorized access" refers to someone who is authorized to access
only certain data or files but accesses unauthorized data or files; and those circuits that
interpret the CFAA more broadly find "exceeds authorized access" refers to someone
who has unrestricted physical access to a computer, but is limited in the use to which
he can put the information).
56. See id. at 857 (rejecting the government's broad interpretation of the CFAA
that would "transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an expansive
misappropriation statute.").
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does the CFAA apply to situations where an employee uses that
confidential information, but did not access the computer and/or the
information in excess of his or her access.57
Currently, employers have to be aware of which circuit court controls the
jurisdiction in which their business is located so that they can properly
However, most
protect trade secrets and confidential information.
employers are unaware of the potentially devastating issues they may face
in light of the CFAA. 59 In NOsal, the Ninth Circuit recognized that there is
an extreme discrepancy in the application of CFAA law throughout the
country because certain jurisdictions find CFAA-related behavior criminal,
while others find it completely innocent.60 Moreover, employee contracts
and company policies are significantly affected by different interpretations
of the CFAA throughout the country.61 The Seventh Circuit provides
employers with the broadest protections, 62 whereas the Ninth Circuit
focuses more on the potential damage caused to average citizens by the
broad interpretation, instead requiring employers to enforce meaningful
restrictions on authorization and access for the CFAA to apply.63
There are several tools that can be used to properly interpret the CFAA,
one of which is the rule of lenity.64 The rule of lenity is a canon of
statutory construction requiring all penal laws to be construed strictly in the

57. See id. (emphasizing that to adopt a narrower reading would result in millions
of unsuspecting individuals finding that they are engaging in criminal conduct).
58. See Orzechowski, supra note 18.
59. See id. (suggesting that technical and physical security measures are more
important in jurisdictions that interpret the CFAA under a Ninth Circuit analysis).
60. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862-63 (rejecting the broader interpretation of the
CFAA promulgated by its sister circuits because these courts looked only at the
culpable behavior of the defendants before them, and failed to consider the effect on
millions of ordinary citizens).
61. See id. at 862 ("Not only are the terms of service vague and generally
unknown-unless you look real hard at the small print at the bottom of a webpagebut website owners retain the right to change the terms at any time and without
notice."); Stephanie Greene & Christine N. O'Brien, Exceeding Authorized Access in
the Workplace: ProsecutingDisloyal Conduct Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 50 AM. Bus. L. J. 281 (2013) (arguing that restrictions on computer use policies
have become blurry ever since more people have started to work from home).
62. See generally Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 418 (7th Cir.
2006).
63. See generallyNosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
64. See Samantha Jensen, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why
Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REv. 81, 95-102 (2013)
(discussing the relevant doctrines and canons of statutory construction that can be used
to interpret the CFAA, including: the void for vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine, the rule of lenity, the plain language rule, and others).
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name of fairness and notice because of the gravity of what is at stake.65
The CFAA makes some actions criminally punishable by law, and
therefore, where there is ambiguity in the language of this statute, the rule
of lenity should apply.66 The Ninth Circuit has adopted this narrow
interpretation to prevent, "[making] criminals of large groups of people
who would have little reason to suspect they [were] committing a crime." 67
According to the Act's legislative history, the CFAA defined "exceeds
authorized access" as an event where an individual accessed a "computer
with authorization but used this access for purposes for which this
authorization does not extend."68 Legislative history suggests that this
broad language was later replaced to "remove[] from the sweep of the
statute one of the murkier grounds of liability, under which a[n] . .
employee's access to computerized data might be legitimate in some
circumstances, but criminal in other (not clearly distinguishable)
circumstances." 69 This statement exemplifies Congress's intent for the
statute to be read narrowly and supports the Ninth Circuit's
interpretations.7 0

III. A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION THAT ILLUSTRATES THE POSITIVE AND
NEGATIVE OUTCOMES OF THE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
CONCERNING THE CFAA

The following hypothetical exemplifies the confusion and ambiguity
found within the circuit courts' respective interpretations.n
65.

See id. at 98-99 (explaining that the rule of lenity embodies two important

policies: (1) "citizens should be given fair warning in easily understood language of
behavior that can result in criminal sanctions;" and (2) "laws with criminal penalties
are a reflection of society's condemnation and should be defined by legislatures, not
courts"); see also Greene, supra note 61 ("The rule of lenity, a rule of statutory
construction for criminal statutes, requires a restrained, narrow interpretation.").
66. See Greene, supra note 61 (iterating that before applying the rule of lenity, a
court must conclude that there is serious ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute that
normal methods of statutory construction cannot resolve).
67. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (considering the dangers of turning the CFAA into
a catch-all statute).
68.

See generally S. Rep. No. 99-432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2479 (adopting the narrower interpretation of the CFAA followed by the Ninth
Circuit).
69.

See id. at 21.

70. See Abramowitz, supra note 36 (addressing the Senate Judiciary Committee's
approval of the amendment in 2011).
71. See Augello, supra note 2 (suggesting that CFAA resolution will not come
soon); Orzechowski, supra note 18 (explaining that U.S. circuit courts have not
provided clear guidance on the proper interpretation of the CFAA); see also Greene,
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GWEN, Inc., a high-end fashion clothing and accessories company,
serves clients primarily in the music and movie industries with its one-of-akind couture creations. Karen has been a well-respected employee of
GWEN, Inc. for the past ten years, and now she wants to quit her job as the
company's Senior Global Ambassador. Karen's duties included meeting
with high-end clients, styling them for major red carpet and Hollywood
events, traveling all over the world marketing the GWEN, Inc. brand, and
looking for new and innovative styles that GWEN, Inc. could use in future
clothing collections. Karen supervises many people, and most of her
managerial work consists of training young and future global ambassadors
for GWEN, Inc.
Since joining GWEN, Inc., Karen has developed priceless relationships
with Hollywood clients, designers, stylists, photographers, and magazine
editors for the high-end clothing company. She is deeply familiar with the
intricacies of the fashion industry, and she has decided to quit her job at
GWEN, Inc. and pursue her life-long dream of becoming a fashion
designer.
Karen hopes to start her own fashion line and develop it into a brand.
While she can handle the artistic side of creating a new company, she does
not know anything about the financial planning that comes with it. She
remembers that one of her friends, Emily, who also works at GWEN, Inc.,
works in the finance department of the company. Karen tells Emily about
her plans, and Karen offers Emily a position at her new company as its
Chief Financial Officer, a position much higher, both in salary and in
prestige, than the job Emily currently possesses at GWEN, Inc. Emily
jumps at the opportunity to receive a raise and gain more power in her
career.
However, to turn this dream into reality, Karen needs GWEN, Inc.'s
financial records to see the company's contractual obligations, the
monetary value of those contracts, and the company's tax planning
information. Karen wants to use this confidential information to help kickstart her new company, but since she left GWEN, Inc., she no longer has
access to this type of confidential information and needs Emily's help
before she resigns. Emily agrees and sends Karen the sensitive tax
information and trade secrets.72
supra note 61 (arguing that restrictions on computer use policies have become
confusing due to society's technological advancement and shifting work style).
72.

See Ramon A. Klitzke, The Umiform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 277,

278 (1980-1981) (explaining that the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret
as "information, including a formula, pattern, compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it.").
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Now that Karen has GWEN, Inc.'s financial records, she decides to start
contacting all of the people that she cultivated professional relationships
with over the years while working at GWEN, Inc. However, she created
these relationships as a representative of, and on behalf of GWEN, Inc., but
now wants these clients to work exclusively with her new company. Even
though the clients worked with Karen directly while she was at GWEN,
Inc., more senior officials would make the arrangements. The client
contracts would be signed with GWEN, Inc. and not Karen, since
celebrities and other famous stars do not want many people to know their
personal information. Apart from safety issues, celebrities love to shock
the public, so before they go on stage or the red carpet, they keep private
"who" they will be wearing. Therefore, only a handful of people actually
know before the big debut with Karen being one of them.
According to GWEN, Inc.'s employee manual and terms-of-use policy,
any and all confidential information is to remain within the confines of the
company, GWEN, Inc., and distribution of any of this information is
strictly prohibited. Once a person is no longer an employee of GWEN,
Inc., whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the agency relationship with
GWEN, Inc. and all powers, access, and confidential information about the
company cease to exist. When applied to these set of facts, the Seventh
Circuit analysis and the Ninth Circuit Analysis can cause vastly distinct
results.73
A.

Under a Seventh CircuitAnalysis, Karen Will Most Likely Be
Found Guilty of Violating the Computer FraudandAbuse Act
Because the Seventh Circuit Provides BroadEmployer Protections
in These Situations

If the reviewing court applies the broad Seventh Circuit standard of the
CFAA, both Karen and Emily will be held liable because of the Seventh
Circuit's employer-friendly reading of the CFAA.74 In the Seventh Circuit,
73. See supra note 9.
74. See United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1125 (8th Cir. 2011) (convicting
an employee for improperly accessing President Obama's student loan records); United
States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1261, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (ruling that an
employee exceeded authorized access by reviewing personal records of numerous
different individuals for nonbusiness reasons-that he did not use the information to
defraud anyone or gain financially is irrelevant); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263,
270 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that an employee only had authorized access to certain
information for specific reasons, so when she accessed it under other pretenses, she
violated the CFAA); Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 431 (7th Cir.
2006) (finding a violation of the CFAA when the agency relationship terminated due to
the employee's violation of his employment contract); see also Augello, supra note 2
(analyzing the various competing discrepancies in CFAA interpretations).
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any employee that accesses information on a computer to the detriment of
his employer has violated a duty of loyalty under agency law, which in
effect terminates the agency relationship and gives him no proper
authorization." Any rights that the employee had were governed by the
agency relationship with the employer, so any employee-authorized access
expires once the agency relationship has been violated.7 6
The First Circuit also contributed to this school of thought by holding
that an employee exceeds authorized access by violating both use and
access restrictions.7 This suggests that whenever an employee violates his
or her employer's company employee manual or terms of use agreement,78
he or she loses the permitted access once received as an employee, and
therefore, any sensitive information used or obtained after this gross
violation is a serious breach of the CFAA.
In the proposed hypothetical, and under a Seventh Circuit analysis, any

75.

See Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC, 440 F.3d at 419 (finding that an employee is

without authorization once he violates his fiduciary duty of loyalty to his employer);
see also Teague, 646 F.3d at 112 1(stating that employees violate the CFAA when they
abuse their privileged access to confidential information); Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1261
(clarifying that the CFAA states that merely accessing information by exceeding
authorized access constitutes criminal conduct under the CFAA); John, 597 F.3d at 268
(rejecting the argument that the CFAA prohibits using authorized access to obtain or
alter prohibited information but allows unlawful use of material that was gained
through authorized access); Field, supra note 2 (explaining that an employee's adverse
interests are enough to terminate an agency relationship in employment cases).
76. See Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC; 440 F.3d at 419 (analyzing the role of agency

relationships in CFAA interpretation); see also Teague, 646 F.3d at 1121 (stating that
an employee prohibited from accessing information without proper authorization will
be held liable under the CFAA); Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1261 (holding that accessing

confidential information without permission is a violation of the CFAA); John, 597
F.3d at 268 (claiming that the employee violated the CFAA once she committed the
acts adverse to her employer's interest).
77. See generally EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica, 274 F.3d 577, 577 (1st Cir.
2001); Field, supra note 2 (arguing that clear contracts are the best mechanisms for
employers to protect themselves from employees who want to steal their confidential
business information).
78. See Field, supra note 2, at 828 ("Language within employment contracts and
documents can vary greatly, with some having only vague reference to employees
maintaining confidentiality and not exposing trade secrets, and others explicitly stating

that employees are not authorized to access or distribute certain confidential company
information.").
79. See EF Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 583 (arguing that employee manuals and
policies are good tools for employers to protect themselves, but they are not enough in
certain jurisdictions); see also id. (explaining that most courts require the contracts or
terms to explicitly state the limits of employees' authorization); Orzechowski, supra
note 18 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit considers "exceeding authorized access" to
include accessing information for purposes other than those permitted by one's
employer).
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access Karen had to confidential information was terminated the moment
that she quit her job at GWEN, Inc. Whether or not Karen herself logged
onto a GWEN, Inc. computer is unimportant for the purposes of this
analysis, as she still used and obtained the information once her agency
relationship with GWEN, Inc. ceased.
Another critical point is that Karen plans to use this confidential
information to the detriment of GWEN, Inc. She intends to steal GWEN,
Inc.'s celebrity clients as well as any potential future contracts it may have
with others in the industry, such as magazine editors, photographers, and
other high-end fashion designers to further the future success of her own
business. Much like the employee in InternationalAirport Centers, LLC,
Karen had decided to quit her job in violation of her employment
agreement to start a competing business.so Karen also resembles the
employee who exceeded authorized access when he obtained President
Obama's student loan records in Teague. The personal information
concerning magazine editors, photographers, clients, and other powerful
figures in the fashion industry was just as confidential to GWEN, Inc. as
President Obama's student loan records are to the President himself.8
Karen also wants to know how GWEN, Inc. pays its taxes and any of its
other financial planning information. This information could provide
Karen with the opportunity to copy the company's contractual plans and
trade schemes, and it would also allow her to expose and blackmail
GWEN, Inc. if she were to become aware of tax evasion, unfair employeepay practices, or other unjust and deceptive behavior. If Karen were to take
advantage of any of these opportunities, such action would certainly be to
the detriment of GWEN, Inc. as a leading retailer in the fashion world.
Emily would also be held liable under the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of the CFAA. 82 Even though she is still an employee of
GWEN, Inc. and she has the authority to access the company's financial
records, it is well outside the scope of her authority to share this
confidential and sensitive information with Karen given that she is no
longer an employee of GWEN, Inc.
Under a similar First Circuit
80. See Int'lAirport Ctrs., LLC, 440 F.3d at 428 (finding a violation of the CFAA
when, after the employee had quit his job-thereby losing access authorization as he
breached his fiduciary duty-he continued to access confidential information).
81. See Teague, 646 F.3d at 1123 (focusing on the employee's detrimental
decision to take advantage of her privileged position of power).
82. See Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC, 440 F.3d at 425 (noting that accessing and
disclosing trade secrets can be a violation of unauthorized access); see also Field, supra
note 2 (arguing that Congress may have kept the statute broad so that it could cover all
situations of computer misuse and not just computer hacking).
83. See EF Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 583-84 (holding that, despite the fact that
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analysis, Emily would be exceeding the bounds of her confidentiality
agreement with her employer. 8 4
Moreover, Emily has clearly violated her duty of loyalty to GWEN, Inc.
under the theory of agency law. Emily has breached GWEN, Inc.'s terms
of use policy as well as the requirements set forth in GWEN, Inc.'s
employee manual. However, if Emily is somehow able to show that the
language in either or both of the agreements was ambiguous, that she had
no knowledge of the restrictions, or that she did not have proper
understanding of the terms of both policies, then she may have a reasonable
86
Emily is like the employee in Rodriguez who exceeded his
defense.
authorized access when he used the Social Security Administration's
database to gather information on potential romantic partners because
Emily is accessing GWEN, Inc.'s information for her own personal
advancement with the goal of landing a better job at Karen's new company
in mind. Emily undoubtedly intended to cause harm to her employer by
accessing the confidential information, which was only furthered by her
subsequent detrimental action of sending the information to Karen. The
actions of accessing and sending the proprietary information to Karen
terminated the agency relationship that Emily had with GWEN, Inc., and
she no longer has proper authorization to proceed with authorized access
into the company's computer, its secret files, or its data.88
he was authorized to use the company's website as it was open to the public, the
employee exceeded his authorization by using confidential information to obtain better
access than other members of the public).
84. See id. at 583 (explaining that not only authority, but also the scope of an
employee's authority, is an important factor to consider when determining CFAA
liability).
85. See Orzechowski, supra note 18 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's broadest
interpretation of the CFAA); see also ALLEN, supra note 8 (explaining the theories of
agency law in terms of fiduciary duties).
86. Contra United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that
the employer's official policy, which was reiterated in training programs that the
employee attended, prohibited misuse of the company's internal computer systems and
confidential customer information. Despite being aware of these policies, "the
employee accessed account information for individuals whose accounts she did not
manage, removed this highly sensitive and confidential information from [the
employer's] premises, and ultimately used this information to perpetrate fraud").
87. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that accessing information for an employee's personal reasons exceeds the
scope of authorization); see also United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1122 (8th
Cir. 2011) (clarifying that the employee exceeded authorized access when she did so to
further personal interests).
88. See Teague, 646 F.3d at 1119, 1126 (8th Cir. 2011) (ruling that the employee's
use of the information is irrelevant, if it is obtained without authorization); Rodriguez,
628 F.3d at 1263 (holding that an employee exceeds authorized access when his
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There are important similarities between Emily in the proposed
hypothetical and the employee in John.8 9 Emily, who legally accessed
GWEN Inc.'s confidential financial files and gave them to Karen, is like
the employee in John, who in similar circumstances legally accessed
customer account information and provided her half-brother with this
sensitive information, so that they could incur fraudulent charges. 90 Emily,
like the employee in John, should have known, or reasonably should have
known, that she was not authorized to access a computer in furtherance of
an action that violates the terms of use, company policy, or, in the case of
John, the law.9 ' Emily exceeded the purpose for which her access was
given. She most likely knew that she was violating GWEN, Inc.'s
company policy, and she should have known that she was outside the scope
of her access when she wanted to share GWEN, Inc.'s confidential trade
secrets.92

B.

Under a Ninth CircuitAnalysis, Karen Will Most Likely Be Found
Not Guilty of Violating the Computer Fraudand Abuse Act
Because the Ninth CircuitProvides Narrow Employee Protections
in These Situations

If the reviewing court applies a Ninth Circuit analysis of the CFAA, both
Karen and Emily will most likely be found innocent because the Ninth
Circuit affords employees more protection.9 3 In Nosal, the Ninth Circuit

interest in acquiring the confidential information is in conflict with his employer's
interest); John, 597 F.3d at 271 (emphasizing that going beyond the limits of
authorization may constitute a CFAA violation); Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440
F.3d at 421 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that adverse employer-employee interests in
terms of agency law may produce a violation of the CFAA).
89. See John, 597 F.3d at 269 (noting that the employee exceeded her authorized
access when she intended on using her employer's confidential information for
purposes other than those for which she was given permission by her employer).

90.

See id.

91. Id. at 271 (explaining that an employee would exceed authorized access if he
or she used that access to obtain or steal information to the detriment of his or her
employer as part of a criminal scheme).

92.

See id.

93.
See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (cautioning that
a broad interpretation would create precedent for employers to threaten to report minor
violations); see also LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir.
2009) ("[F]or purposes of the CFAA, when an employer authorizes an employee to use
a company computer subject to certain limitations, the employee remains authorized to
use the computer even if the employee violates those limitations."); see also Dial,
supra note 5 (discussing the importance of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Nosal as it
pertains to practical societal implications); see also Orzechowski, supra note 18
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limited application of the term "exceeds authorized access" to situations
relating to improper access of a computer and its information, but it does
not include the use of information that has been derived.94 Therefore, an
individual "exceeds authorized access" by violating a restriction on access
to a work computer but not a restriction on use of a work computer and its
contents.9 5

In the proposed hypothetical, Karen never improperly accessed a
computer or its information; she only used information that was derived by
Emily. Much like the employee in WEC CarolinaEnergy Solutions, LLC,
who used his former employer's confidential business information to
develop a competing business, Karen is unlikely to be held liable under the
CFAA because she did not access the files illegally. 96 Additionally, like the
employee in Nosal who convinced his former colleagues to download and
send him confidential information from their firm to him, Karen convinced
Emily, a former GWEN, Inc. colleague of hers, to download GWEN, Inc.'s
confidential financial information and send it to her.97 Therefore, Karen
never exceeded authorized access by violating any access restrictions
because she never utilized GWEN, Inc.'s computers improperly; she did
not even touch the computer. 98

(advising employers to be careful in managing employee access to proprietary
information and emphasizing the importance of technical and security measures to
protect employers because in jurisdictions with a narrower interpretation, the CFAA
does not easily apply).
94. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (noting that the CFAA was intended to combat
hacking, not unauthorized use of information); see also Abramowitz, supra note 36
(noting that the opinions in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits find that the CFAA only
addresses an employee's improper access, not improper use of confidential
information).
95. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (finding that "exceeds authorized access," refers to
data or files on a computer that one was not authorized to access by one's employer);
see also L VRC Holdings, LLC, 581 F.3d at 1134 (ruling that it is the employer's actions
rather than the employee's state of mind that determines an employee's authorized
access).
96. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th
Cir. 2012).
97.

See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856; see also L VRC Holdings, LLC, 581 F.3d at 1134

(holding that the employee did not exceed his authorized access when he e-mailed
documents from his work computer to his personal computer because he had
permission to use his employer's computer).
98. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (adopting a broad CFAA interpretation); see also
Abramowitz, supra note 36 (noting that the Fourth and Ninth Circuits find that the
CFAA only addresses an employee's improper access, as opposed to improper use
which is not taken into account); Orzechowski, supra note 18 (explaining that
employee access to information should be expanded only if and when necessary under
a Ninth Circuit analysis).
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Emily would also not be held liable under a Ninth Circuit analysis
because even though she accessed a work computer to gain the confidential
information, her access was legal.99 She may have handed it over to Karen,
who breached a duty of loyalty, but under the Ninth Circuit's reading of the
CFAA, the statute does not apply to individuals that have authority to
access a computer but later misuse the information. 00 Therefore, Emily's
actions would be found to be lawful.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION IS THE PROPER ANALYSIS OF

THE CFAA

Today, the employment landscape is fraught with different jurisdictional
interpretations of the CFAA. Thus, employers must be mindful of the split
in authority to properly protect their computer systems, trade secrets, and
confidential information. For example, in those jurisdictions where the
CFAA is interpreted broadly, employers ought to clearly define all terms in
their employee manuals and specify what it means to misuse confidential
information.' 0 Having these detailed documents, in addition to a training
program, may be sufficient to prove that an employee was aware of and
understood the rules by which he or she was governed.1 0 2 Conversely, in
jurisdictions where the Ninth Circuit's narrow approach is taken,
employers ought to put in safeguards to limit any access of confidential
information by its employees in an effort to expose them only to the
information that they need to know.'0 3 This continued split requires either
a legislative or judicial fix.
Given that courts are split as to how to apply the CFAA,1 0 4 especially as
it pertains to the interpretation and understanding of the term and phrase

99. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859 (discussing that those courts who have adopted a
broad reading of the CFAA have "failed to consider the effect on millions of ordinary
citizens" caused by the statute's ambiguous language); see also L VRC Holdings, LLC,
581 F.3d at 1131 (noting that the CFAA prohibits a number of different computer
crimes).
100. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856 (applying the plain language of the CFAA to an
analogous situation).
101. See Orzechowski, supra note 18 (discussing the importance and responsibility
that employers have in setting the stage of a possible CFAA claim through their
contracts and employee manuals).
102. Id.
103. See id. (emphasizing that employers can be left extremely vulnerable in
jurisdictions that adopt Ninth Circuit interpretations if they don't take proper
precautions).
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2010); see also Orzechowski, supra note 18 (indicating
that Court confusion in regards to CFAA interpretation will continue until Congress or
the Supreme Court steps in).
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"authorization" and "exceeds authorized access," 05 Congress should adopt
the Ninth Circuit's narrow reading 06 as the appropriate interpretation.
Originally enacted as an anti-hacking statute, Congress was unable to
predict how the CFAA would apply to modem cases due to vast
technological advancement. 0 7
However, as the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged, the rule of lenity os provides some guidance in its
requirement that penal laws be construed strictly to give fair notice.1 09
Absent fair notice, there exists the ability to "make criminals of large
groups of people who would have little reason to suspect they are
committing a federal crime," an outcome unlikely intended by Congress. 110
As mentioned, interpretation under a broader regime could result in
several unintended outcomes impacting corporate culture. First, if a broad
interpretation of the CFAA is adopted, then there is a grave risk that people
will be held criminally liable for actions that they believed to be legal."'
This is particularly true as it pertains to terms of use and terms of service.
In an age where policies and their legally binding terms can change with
the click of a mouse and with no requirement to notify the public at large,
everyday computer users run the risk of violating provisions of the
CFAA."1 2
Second, a broad reading of the CFAA would result in extreme
105. See Augello, supra note 2 (noting that definitions of key terms in the CFAA
still remain unsettled).
106. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (interpreting the
CFAA as targeting "the unauthorized procurement or alteration of information, not its
misuse or misappropriation").
107. See Justin Precht, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or the
Modern Criminal at Work: The DangersofFacebookfrom Your Cubicle, 82 U. CIN. L.
REv. 359, 365 (2013) (explaining that the CFAA was originally enacted as legislation
to deal with technological advancement at the time that it was passed); see also
Orzechowski, supra note 18 (stating that district courts in the Second, Fourth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have also adopted narrow interpretations of the CFAA).
108. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
109. See Orzechowski, supra note 18 (stating that the Ninth Circuit focused on the
rule of lenity when deciding Nosal).
110. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859 ("While ignorance of the law is no excuse, [the Ninth
Circuit] can properly be skeptical as to whether Congress, in 1984, meant to
criminalize conduct beyond that which is inherently wrongful, such as breaking into a
computer.").
111. See Orzechowski, supra note 18 (listing the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits as also adopting broader interpretations of the words, "authorization" and
"exceeds authorized access" so that they include violating terms of use policies and
breaches of the duty of loyalty under the theory of agency law).
112. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (explaining that given the ease with which these terms
can change, "behavior that wasn't criminal yesterday can become criminal today
without an act of Congress, and without any notice whatsoever.").
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punishments for very minimal acts both in and out of the workplace. For
example, as the Ninth Circuit explained in Nosal, "minor dalliances," like
checking Facebook or Instagram on a work computer, would become
criminally punishable by federal law.' 13 Even outside of the employment
context, many websites accessed by everyday users prohibit the posting of
misleading information or access to minors.114 While there may be menial
punishments for such errors in judgment, they ought not amount to a prison
sentence.
Recent congressional action on the part of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
proposes that the CFAA should be amended to adopt the narrow view of
the Ninth Circuit.'"5 Senator Leahy has introduced the amendment to say
that a "Computer Fraud and Abuse Act action may not be brought where
the sole basis for determining unauthorized access to a computer is an
alleged violation of an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement
with an Internet service provider, Internet website, or non-government
employer."ll 6 Congress should adopt this new language, so that employers,
employees, and courts can have a better understanding of when the CFAA
does and does not apply.
The United States Supreme Court should also seek certiorari on this
circuit split to ameliorate the confusion associated with the Act's
interpretation. If the Supreme Court were to decide the scope of the
CFAA's interpretation, the lower courts would be able to apply it in a
uniform fashion. However, in 2012 the United States government declared
that it would not seek Supreme, Court review of the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Nosal.117 Therefore, the Circuit split will continue to reign over CFAA
case law for the near future unless a legislative fix is successfully adopted.

113. See supra note 46; see e.g., Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861 ("Adopting the
government's interpretation would turn vast numbers of teens and pre-teens into
juvenile delinquents-and their parents and teachers into delinquency contributors.").
114. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861-62 (providing examples from eHarmony to eBay of the
multitude of ways that the average computer users could violate the CFAA under a
broad interpretation).
115. See Abramowitz, supra note 36 (assessing the past and present Congressional
action in regards to CFAA amendments).
116. See id. (addressing the present and possibly future political and judicial action
in regards to the CFAA).
117. See Grant McCool, U.S. Will Not Challenge Computer Fraud Case to High
Court, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/08/net-uscomputerfraud-law-idUSBRE8771BK20120808 (interpreting the repercussions of not
seeking certiorari of the Nosal case); see also Dial, supra note 5 (arguing that the
CFAA issue will be prolonged since the Nosal case will not be up before the Supreme
Court).
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CONCLUSION

The circuit split has a significant impact not only on employer-employee
relationships in a business setting, but also on the judges throughout the
country who struggle with how to interpret and apply the CFAA. Congress
intended for the CFAA to combat hacking, but as society continues to
develop and utilize advanced technologies, employers have to grapple with
new issues concerning computers and confidential information. With two
different standards of application, courts are lacking adequate guidance on
where
they
should
fall
on
the
spectrum.
There are only two available and complicated redresses to solve this
conflict. One is for Congress to amend the current CFAA and to reflect
one of the two schools of thought. Another possibility is for the Supreme
Court to directly address the ambiguities created by the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.

